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0. Introduction: 
Discourse Relations and Scope of Negation 
Shensheng Zhu 
Unversity of Arizona 
On the assumption that negation is a static closure which deprives an indefinite term of 
its dynamics, Dynamic Montague Granunar (Groenendijk and Stokhot; 1990) (G&S hitherto) 
provides an elegant account of why an indefinite term in the classic donkey sentences like those 
in (1) can not bind a pronominal beyond its syntactic scope·1 
(1) a *Every fanner1 who owns a donkey2 beats it2. He1 hates it2. 
b. *If a fannert owns a donkey2, he1 beats it2. He1 hates it2. 
c. *No fanner1 beats a donkey2. He1 likes it2. 
When applied to an expanded set of data, however, this initial DMG account seems to make 
wrong predictions. As we will see later, there are cases where an indefinite NP that apparently 
lies within the scope of negation is capable ofbinding a pronominal beyond its syntactic scope. 
To accommodate this expanded data, G&S introduce dynamic versions of negation and similar 
logical operations which are otherwise considered as tests. This move, however, comes with 
some negative consequences. The most serious one is that the dynamic negation entails some 
suspicious semantic properties of negation, which are generally not allowed. Moreover, the 
subsequently proposed monotonicity constraint is not empirically satisfactory. In this paper, I 
propose a major revision to G&S's DMG. I argue that the introduction of dynamic definitions 
of negation and similar operators is wrongly motivated by misunderstanding of the scope of 
1 As will become clear later on, this statement is based on the assumption that :t d1 [P(d1) => Q(d1)] = -2d1 
[P(d,); -Q{d,)] and lll=>l(l a -[-1(1;-<1>] 
® 1997 by Shensheng Zhu 
K. Kuswnoto (ed.), NELS 27, 441-4SS 
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negation. Once we get the scope of negation right , we will be able to account for 
intersentential binding in various donkey sentences without resorting to the notion of dynamic 
negation. But to determine the negation scope for a particular logical expression, we will have 
to take discourse relations into consideration. This can be achieved by means of contextualized 
translation. 
1. A Brief Review ofDMG 
From the viewpoint of dynamic semantics, "sentences typically introduce new 
discourse referents and deactivate old ones, thereby constraining the way discourse unfolds" 
(Chierchia, 1995). In other words, apart from its truth conditional content, a sentence has the 
potential to change the context. Assuming that 4> is an adequate IL (Intensional Logic) 
translation of a sentence, then the context change potential ( CCP) of 4> is A.p [ 4> 1\ v p]. p in the 
formula represents the possible sequel to tjl. v is the usual extensional operator, just as its right 
inverse " is the intensional operator. CCP of 4> can be written as t 4> . The uparrow t is thus a 
type lifting operator which lifts 4> to its CCP, viz., A.p[tjl 1\ vp]. The inverse of t is the 
downarrow .J.., which maps a CCP into the corresponding static proposition. The downarrow 
is defined as .J..<I>= <ll("true). In this definition, <I> is of type ((s,t),t) and true is a constant of type 
t and "true is a representation in DIL (Dynamic Intensional Logic) of the predicate 'is a 
possible state'. Application of "true to <I> thus results in a formula which represents the truth 
value of <I>. For this reason .J.. is said to function as a closure operator, which closes off a text. 
It reduces the meaning of a sentence to its truth-conditional content, depriving the sentences of 
any dynamic effects it may have had. It is further assumed that once a text is closed off: its 
dynamic effects can not be restored. 
According to the core principles of DMG, the fundamental feature of dynamic 
semantics is that an existentially quantified term a is capable of binding a variable f3 outside 
the syntactic scope of a unless a is inside the scope of a negation and f3 outside. Essential to 
DMG are the notions of static negation, dynamic conjunction and dynamic existential 
quantification. 
(2) Definition (Static Negation): -<1>= t ,.J..<I> 
By the very property of .J.., the law of double negation does not hold: as .....-4>= 
t -,.J, t -,.J..<Il= t ..,..,.J..<I>= t .J..<I>. In t .J..<I>, .J.. closes off the text, thus blocking the dynamic effects 
of <I>. 
(3) Definition (Dynamic Conjunction): <ll;\jl=l..p[<ll("('P(p)))], where p has no free 
occurrences in either <I> or \jl. 
<I>; 'I' represents a sequence of two sentences. Conjoining <I> with 'I' dynamically amounts to 
taking the intensional composition of the functions denoted by the two sentences. 
(4) Definition (Dynamic Existential Quantifier) �A.p3x{x/d }(<llp) 
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In 4, ;I is the dynamic counterpart of 3; d is a discourse marker; p is a proposition variable 
functioning as a place holder, so to speak, for the in-coming sentence. (xlcf) is a state switcher, 
which turns an expression of type e into an expression of the same type. The state switcher 
determines the state against which a discourse marker is evaluated, reminiscent of assignment 
function in classic Montague grammar. As a state switcher in an expression moves inwards, it 
assigns value to discourse markers. G&S list the foUowing properties of state switchers. 
(5) Some Properties of State Switchers 
a. {a/ d}c = c, for every constant 
{a/d}v =v, for every variable 
b. { a/d}d=a. 
{a/d}d'= d', for aU d'eDM, d"#:d' 
c. {a/d}(l3(y}={a /d}l3({a/d}y ) 
d. { a/d}(4lA<p )={ a/d}4l A { a/d}<p (analogously for negation and the other connectives) 
e. { a/d} 3l!CF3v{ a/d}4l, ifv does not occur freely in a (analogously for 'v'v4l) 
f. {a/d}(l3=y) = {a/d}13={a/d}y 
g. { a/d} A.vl3 = A.v{ a/d} 13, if v does not occur freely in a 
h. {a/d) "13="13 
i. {a/d}vl3 "#!vl3 
The inward movement of a state switcher in an expression results in one of these three 
situations: a state switcher resolves when it hits a corresponding discourse marker; it 
disappears when it runs into a variable, a constant or a different discourse marker; it stays when 
it ends up in front of vl3 . The static nature of the universal quantifier, implication and 
disjunction are also defined in a similar manner. 
(6) Definition (Static Universal quantifier): :Yd<ll--;!d-<11 
(7) Definition (Internal Dynamic hnplication): <l>=>w=--[<1>;-w] 
(8) Definition (Static Disjunction): <I> or ljl=--[-<11;-ljl) 
In 6 and 7, :Yand => are  dynamic counterparts of the classic 'v' and � respectively. By 6, a 
universal quantifier can not bind a variable beyond its syntactic scope because aU the dynamic 
effects are blocked by negation. Given the equivalence of -!.-;!d-<I>=.J..-:td<l>,:td<l>= -.;!d-<11 
-t -.-!.-�d-<l>='t -..J..-:td<l>=t -..J.. t -..J..:yd<l>=t -.-..J..:td<I>=U:td<l>. In G&S, it is assumed that 
t .J..:td<I>=A.p['v'x[{x/d}(<l>("true)))A vp), hence the equivalence in 9. 
(9) :Yd<I>=A.p['v'x[{x/d} (<l>("true))] Avp) 
It clear from 9 that vp lies beyond the binding scope of the universal quantifier. Similarly, 
negation closes off implication and disjunction, making them extemaUy static. It should also be 
noted that disjunction is also intemaUy static because within [-<11;-ljl), <I> is closed off by 
negation. For the convenience of translation and representation, the foUowing equivalences are 
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adopted which enable us to replace dynamic operators with their static counterparts at the 
level of truth-conditional content. 
(10) Equivalences 
a. .j, tcjl=cjl 
b. -t.P::t-.41 
C. rtc��;t!p)= t(c!IA<P) 
d. [tcll:::>tcp)=t[�) 
e. [tell ortcp)= t[cpvcp] 
The above rules and definitions, which fonn the core of DMG, seem to provide a 
straightforward account of the classic donkey sentences. Take l la for example .. It is 
translated in DIL as l ib, to which all the relevant rules subsequently apply? 
( 1 1) a. A man; walks in the park. He; whistles. 
b. 2a'1 [tman(d,) ;t walk-in-the-park (d,)]; twhistle (d,)) 
c. l..p3x[{x!d,}{t[man(di); walk(d1))(p))]; t whistle (d,) 
d. l..p3x ([man (x) " walk(x) A{xld,rpJ;t whistle (d,) 
e. l..q[l..p3x[man(x)/\walk(x)/\(xld,) vp) (" ( twhistle (d,) ( q)))] 
f l..q 3x[man(x)Awalk(x)/\ {xld1 }(twhistle (d,) (q)) 
g. l..q3x[man(x)Awalk(x)/\ whistle(x) 1\ {x/d1} vq] 
It should be noted that through /..-conversion, cp is hooked onto the place holder p (as 
l..p(cp;vp)'lf = (cpA 'If)), thus fillling in the scope of the existential quantifier in cp and the state 
switcher assigns the same value to the variable within the syntactic scope of 3x and the variable 
beyond its syntactic scope .. 
In classic Montague grammar, the universal quantifier is translated as involving 
implication. For instance every will be translated as I..PI..Q'v'x[P(x) -+ vQ(.r)]. Similarly, in 
dynamic semantics, the universal quantifier is translated as I..PA.Qst:d1["P(d1)=> vQ(di)). 
Accordingly, the first sentence of la may be translated as 12a. Then by simple functional 
application, we get 12b from 12a. 
(12) a. I..Qtd1 [[[tfanner(d1); �[tdonkey(�);town(�)(d1)]] => v Q(d1)]; tbeat (d2)(d1) 
b. y_d, mt fanner(d,); � �[t donkey(d2); t own(d2)(d,)JJ=> tbeat (d2Xd1)l 
Given the fact that dl in the antecedent of a conditional can (but need not) be 
replacedby 'j_dl (see Chierchia 1995), which has scope over the whole conditional, we get 13a, 
which is the input string for further interpretative procedure3. 
2We derive l lb by on. translation, l lc by 4, l ld by Def of t and moving the stale switcher inward, 
l le by 3, l lfby A.-iXlnversion and �· elimination and finally l lg by eliminating t. 
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(13) a :t de{d2[[tfanner(dt); t donkey(d2); t own(d2)(dt)]=> tbeat (d2)(dt)] 
b. :tdCst:d2)..p[[[fanner(dt)/\donkey (d2)/\own(d:!)(dt)]--+beat (d2)(dt)/\ vp] 
c. )..p[A.q[Vx'v'y{ xldt} {y/d2}[[fanner( d1)/\donkey( d2)/\own( d2)( dt)] 
--+beat(d2) (dt)]/\ vq]("true)/\ vp] 
d. A.p['v'x'v'y[[fanner(x)"donkey(y)/\own{y)(x)Hbeat{y)(x)]" { xldt} {y/d2} "true l" vPl 
e. /..p('v'x'v'y[[fanner(x)/\donkey{y)/\Own{y)(x)]--+beat{y)(x)]/\ vp]] 
We can see from 13e that vp is not in the binding domain of the universal quantifier; 
therefore )..-conversion is not going to bring the subsequent sentence (He hates it.) into the 
binding scope of the universal quantifier. In a similar manner, the extemally static nature of 
implication is derived. 14a is the on.. translation of 1 b. As the interpretation procedure of 1 b 
essentially parallels that of 1 a, I only write down some of the most important steps involved4. 
(14) a. � d1 � d2 [tfanner(d.);t donkey(d2); own(d2)(dt)]=> t beat (d2)(dt) 
b. A.p3x3y[farmer(x )1\donkey(y)/\Own{y,x)/\ { xldt }{y/d2} v p ]=>A.p[beat(d2)(dt)/\ v p] 
C. -[i..p3x3y[fanner(X)/\dOnkey(y)/\own{y,X)/\ { xfdt} {y/d2} vp ];-)..p[beat(d2)(dt)/\ vp]) 
d. -A.q3x3y[farmer(x)"donkey{y)I\Own{y, x)/\-.beat{y, x)"{xldt} {y/d2rq] 
e. )..p[-.3x3y[fanner(x)/\donkey(y)/\own{y,x)/\-.beat(x)tp] 
In the final derivation, the propositional variable p is not in the binding domain of the 
existential quantifiers, thus the static nature of implication is explained. These examples 
illustrate how static negation closes off an implication text, making the generalized quantifiers 
in it inaccessible to a variable outside its syntactic scope. Negation works in exactly the same 
way with disjunction. As is clear from (8), the main negation closes the whole disjunction off; 
while the secondary negation blocks the dynamics of each disjunct, thus making a disjunction 
both extemally and internally static. The interested reader may refer to G&S for more details 
on the procedure of derivation. 
The above generalization, which may be regarded as the core of DMG, does leave 
many cases uncovered, however. The foUowing are some examples that G&S cite to show 
that so-called tests do allow dynamic binding under certain circumstances. 
(15) a. No player. leaves the room. He1 stays where he1 is. 
b. It is not the case that Jolmt does not own a car2. It2 is red and ih is parked in front of 
hi52 house. 
c. Every player. chooses a paWfi2. He1 puts it2on square one 
d. If a client. comes in, you don't put himt off. You offer him; a cup of coffee. 
3 13b is obtained bylOd and lOc, 13c by 9, !3d by moving the state switcher inwards and i..-amversio11, 13e 
by Sh. 
4 14c is obtained. by applying 7, 14d is reached by the fact that -<I>=Aj)[-.ct>'(true) "vPl and 14e results from 
applying 2, the Det: oft and J. ,  and by eliminating "true. 
5
Zhu: Discourse Relations and Scope of Negation
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1997
4 4 6  SHENSHENG ZHU 
e. A professor1 or an assistant professor2 will attend the meeting of the university 
board. Shelfl will report to the filculty 
f. Either there is no bathroom1 here, or it1 is in a funny place. In either case, it1is not on 
the ground floor. 
The first sentence in each of the above examples is supposed to be a test and yet it allows an 
indefinite term to bind into the subsequent sentence. Confronting evidence like this, G&S 
propose extending the original DMG to include dynamic versions of the relevant logical 
operators. 
(16) a. Definition (Dynamic Universal Quantifier): 1'_£Ml=l..p['ix[{xAI}(ell(p))]] 
b. Definition (Static Universal Quantifier): t J.1'_£Ml=l..p['ix[{x/d}(ell("true))]/\ vp] 
(17) a. Definition (Dynamic Negation):-cl>=l..p-,(cl>(p)) 
b. Definition (Static Negation): t J.-<1>= t -..!.ell 
(18) a. Definition (Dynamic Implication): ell=>ljl=-(ell; -ljl ] 
b. Definition (Static Implication): t .!.ell=>ljl = t .!.-[ell;-ljl] 
(19) a. Dynamic Disjunction: ell or 'V =-[-ell; -ljl] 
b. Static Disjunction: ellor$= -[t J.-c!>;t M] 
In the extended system, universal quantification, negation, implication and disjunction are no 
longer inherently static. We obtain their static counterparts by taking their static closure t.!.. 
With two alternative definitions for each operator, the extended DMG has sufficient flexibility 
to characterize a much larger range of data, including examples in I 5.  But the very flexibility 
afforded by the dual definiton system comes at a considerable cost. 
2. Problems with the Dual Definition System 
The first reaction to this dual definition system ofDMG is that it has to be effectively 
constrained so that the choice between the static and dynamic definitions of a particular 
operator should become predictable. Otherwise, it weakens the explanatory power of a theory. 
An even more serious problem is the dubious nature of dynamic negation as defined in 17 ( cf. 
Dekker, 1993; Chierchia, 1995). Generally speaking, the property entailed by dynamic 
negation are not acceptable. Suppose that Susan did not laugh and she cried. Given this fact, 
that Susan didn't cry is false. Now, assuming 17, we ranslate Susan did't ltulgh and in fact 
she cried as 20a, from which 20b is further derived. 
(20) a. l..p-3x[{x/d1}[  Susan (d1)/\ laugh (di)]/\vp]; cry (d1) 
b. l..q-3x[Susan (d1) 1\ laugh (d1) 1\ cry (di)]/\{x/di}vq 
20b says that it is not true that Susan both laughed and cried. This means that the proposition 
that Susan didn't cry is no longer false. This happens because negation is now allowed to 
include the incoming sentence in its scope. 
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G&S's solution to this problem is to introduce the monotonicity constraint, whereby 
''the translation of each sentence which constitutes a separate step in the discourse should 
denote an upward monotonic quantifier over states". This constraint does not exclude 
downward monotonic sentences. It is just meant to exclude dynamic conjunctions whose first 
conjunct is a downward monotonic (sub )formula So the translation of a sequence of sentences 
<I> and IV can be [<I>';IV'] only if <I>' is upward monotonic. If <I>' is downward monotonic, then 
the translation [t .J..<t>';IV'] has to be used since for any formula <1>, t .J..<I> is upward monotonic. 
This static closure t .J.. then deprives <I> of its dynamics. The same constraint also applies to 
conditionals and relative constructions. Let us see how this constraint works on concrete 
examples. ( In doing so, I basically follow the analysis offered in Dekker (1993)). First , 
consider 15b. The translation of the first sentence (i.e., It is not the case that John does not 
have a car) has the form .......ell. In this example, the subformula <I> (i.e., John owns a car) is 
upward monotonic. Since dynamic negation reverses monotonicity, -<1> is downward 
monotonic and .......ell is upward monotonic again. It is this upward .......ell that is conjoined with 
IV (i.e., It is red and parlcd in from of his house). Although -<1> is downward monotonic, 
.......ell is not, hence the admissible conjunction [- <I>;IV]. The monotonicity constraint also 
correctly rules out discourses like I c. The first sentence in lc (i.e., No farmer beats a donkey) 
is downward monotonic. For this sentence to conjoin with the second sentence, the static 
closure t .J.. has to be used to reverse its monotonicity, resulting in the translation t .J..<t>. This 
static closure blocks the dynamics of <I> in the conjunction [t .J..<I>;IVJ. However, the 
monotonicity constraint fails in cases like the following. 
(21) a It is not the case that John1 doesn't have a carz. ltz is red and parked in front ofhis1 
house. 
b. It is not the case that no student1 in this school has a carz. * ltz is a used one and 
parked in front of his1 dormitory. 
(22) a It is not the case that a man1 jogs in this park everyday. He1 just walks everyday 
b. It is not the case that a man1 jogs in this park everyday. *He1 likes to work out in 
the morning. 
(23) a. No fimner1 beats a donkey2 • He1 does not kick itz either. 
b. No fimner1 beats a donkey2. *He1 likes itz 
By analogy to G&S's analysis, in both 21a and 21b, the first sentences are upward monotonic. 
Such being the case, we expect intersentential binding to be possible in both cases. However, 
although a car in 21a can bind it in the subsequent sentence,. neither no student nor a car in 
21 b is not allowed to antecede a pronominal in the subsequent sentence. 22 and 23 illustrate 
the same problem but from a slightly different perspective. Translated as -<1>, the first sentences 
in 22 and 23 are downward monotonic. Consequently t .J.. has to be used to reverse the 
monotonicity of -<1>. But this deprives -<1> of its dynamics. On this analysis, we expect none of 
these examples to aUow dynamic binding. But the fact is that although 22b and 23b do not 
aUow dynamic binding, 22a and 23a do. 
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The problem demonstrated by the above examples does not go unnoticed by G&S 
themselves. To account for the intersentential pronominalization in the discourse like 23a, 
G&S propose 24 as an alternative interpretation of the determiner no. 
In (24), -t .J.-Q(t d) is downward monotonic and so is the conjunction [P(t d);-t .J.-Q(t d)]. 
As this downward monotonic conjunction is within the scope of the main negation, the whole 
expression is upward monotonic again. But this proposal is no solution to the problem, 
because it does not say when this particular definition of no should be used. Moreover, since 
(24) is specially proposed for the determiner no, it does not offer any explanation for the 
failure of the monotonicity constraint in examples like 2lb or 22b, which do not involve the 
determiner no. 
3. Discourse Effect on Scope of Negation. 
In this section and the one that follows, I propose an alternative approach to the 
linguistic data which motivates the introduction of dual definitions. The key element of my 
proposal is that of contextualized translation, by which a linguistic expression like no, not, 
every, if. .. then and either. .. or receives one of the alternative interpretations which differ in 
terms of negation scope. But which interpretation to choose depends on the discourse context 
in which the sentence containing a particular expression is embedded. In other words, the 
discourse relation will determine to a significant extent how a logical expression will be 
translated. Once such an expression is correctly translated, the core DMG can take care of the 
rest, thus reducing the dual definition system to the core DMG. Let us look at the first 
sentences in 23a and 23b. They may be translated either as 25a or as 25b. 
(25) a. Y..d�2 [farmer (d.); donkey (d2); -beat (d2, d1)] 
b. -�. �2[farmer(d1); donkey (d2); beat (d2, d1)] 
2Sa and 2Sb are equivalent truth-conditionally, but there is some difference as far as their 
context change potential is concerned. In 25a, the universal quantifier takes wider scope over 
negation while in 25b, the existential quantifier is within the scope of negation. It is this 
distinction in terms of negation scope that is responsible for the behaviors of CCP of a 
sentence. So the dynamics of an indefinite term is determined by the scope relation between its 
quantifier and negation. This idea is expressed in 26. 
(26) Dynamic Binding Hypothesis 
A generalized quantifier a. can't dynamically bind a variable J3 if a. is within the scope 
of a negation which separates a. from j3. 
One of the implications of 26 is that a generalized quantifier, whether it is existential or 
universal, is inherently dynamic. This is one major difference from the core DMG, which 
assumes that the universal quantifier is inherently static. 
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Although the notion of negation scope is invoked in DMG, it is not well defined In 
DMG, a sentence with a negation expression is uniformly referred to as a negated sentence, 
which is notationally represented as -<1>. The term negawl sentence used in this way 
obliterates the fact that a sentence with a negation expression in it may have two posstble 
interpretations. On one interpretation, as with 25a, the negation is within the scope of the 
quantifier. I will call this internal negation. On the other interpretation, as with 25b, the 
negation takes wide scope over the quantifier. I will refer to this as external negation. 
However, as was shown by 23 and 27, the scope of negation for a particular linguistic 
expression is not always clear from the S-structure position of this expression. Whether a 
negation expression such as no or not should be assigned an external negation or internal 
negation is crucially determined by discourse relations. Tentatively, a negation expression will 
be interpreted as internal negation when two adjacent sentences in a minimal discourse 
segment K, are semantically contrastive. In 23 a, for instance, the semantic (or lexical) 
contrast is between beat and kick. Yet this kind of semantic contrast does not exist in 23b. 
Consequently, no in 23b is assigned a narrow scope. The discourse effect on the translation of 
logical expressions can be captured by means of contextualized translation. Take no and it is 
not the case for instance5. 
(29) Contextualized Translation of no 
a. ).Pi..<rl[� [P(� d;)) if no is contained in <f) and Ctr<<f),ljl>; or 
b. ).Pi..Q-� [P(�);Q(�)] 
(30) Contextualized Translation of It is not the case/not 
a. ).Pi..Q ad; [P(d;)-+-Q(d;)] if the negation expression is contained in <f) and 
Ctr«l>,ljl>; or 
b. ).Pi..Q-ad; [P(�);Q(dJ)) 
29a or 30a is chosen U: as required by the conditional clause, <f) and ljl form a discourse 
characterized by semantic contrast. 29b and JOb are the default translation of no. In 23, only 
23a qualifies as a discourse of contrast. Consequently, no in 23a should be translated in 
the form of 29a whereas no in 23b can only be assigned the default translation. The 
resulting translation are exactly 25a and 25b respectively. Similarly, in 22, only 22a is a 
case of contrastive discourse. Accordingly, the negation expression it is not the case in 
22a should be interpreted as internal negation (as in 3 1 a), while that in 22b the arne 
expression is interpreted as external negation (as 3 lbt. 
�In 29, Ctr (<ll;ljl) indicates the presence of the semantic contrastiveness between ell and 'I'· In 30. a is a 
variable ranging over both universl and existential quantifiers, a convnetion I will follow throughout the 
�per. 
21a seems to pose a problem for 30. To account for the intended reading for 21a and 2 1b, we need to translate 
them as (I) and (2) respectively. 
(I) 2t/12d2[John (dJ);car(dl);-have [d2. d11l 
(2) -2dJ2 d1 [sllldent (dJ);car(dl); have (�. d1)] 
9
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(31) a. ;I d1 [man (d1); -jog-in-the-park-everyday (di)] 
b. -2 d1 [man (d1); jog-in-the-park-everyday (di)] 
Contextualized translation of other logical expressions such as every, if. .. then, either... or, 
crucially depends on the notion of Continuity, a canonical discourse relation. 
(32) Definition of Continuity 
In a discourse segment K, K=<cl>, IJI>, Continuity holds between cl> and 1J1 if 
a. cl> is a more general statement and IJI is a more specific statement on the same topic 
as ct>· 
b. cl> w'td 111 are structurally parallel and lexically comparable7 to each other; or 
c. cl> and IJI denote a succession of episodes in an event and the episode denoted by 
cl>temporally precedes the episode denoted by IJI. 8 
The three types of Cont(muity) descnbed by Clauses a, b and c may be notationally represented 
as cl>(:)IJI, cl>&IJI and cl»IJI respectively. On the basis of 32, every or each may be translated 
as follows. 
(33) Contextualized Translation of every/each: 
a. A.R[A.PI..Q 'i_d; [P(d) -+Q(d;)]; R(d;)] if every/each is in cl> and Cont<cl>;IJI>;or 
b. A.R[A.PI..Q -;J.d; [P(di);-Q(d;)]; R(d;)] 
In 33a, the universal quantifier is not closed off by negation and therefore it can bind a variable 
in R(d;). In contrast, the existential quantifier in 33b is within the scope of the main negation, 
2 needs little comment but 1 requires some explanation. It is not hard to see that there is no semantic conuast 
between the first and second sentences in 21a Nonetheless, the negation expressions (It is not the case and 
not)in the first sentence are still interpreted as internal negation. I will argue , however, 21a is not a legitimate 
counteiCXalllple to my proposal. As Chierchia (1991) points out, cases like 21b "are not directly analyzable as 
in tenus of the kind of binding we are studying here, but could be filirly 51111ightfowardly be analyzed as E-type 
pronouns". Another possible explanation is that what the NP a Ctll' denotes is a specific and unique referent and 
the sentence should be interpreted as For a Ctll' x such that it is not the case that John does not have x. On this 
interpretation, the existential quantifier should take wide scope over both negations. 
1. An infonnal diagnostic for lexical comparability of pmlicates :r andy is to conjoin them in a answer to a 
simple WH question whose pmlicate is a superordinate of :r. If y can fit into the answer, then we may consider 
:r andy as lexically comparable. 
(1) What do you do to the donkey every morning? 
a I feed it andibut don't it . b. l beat it andlbutdon't it 
(2) How do you feel about your donkey? 
--
a I hate it and/ but don't it b. I like it and/ but don't it 
In the answers to the first question, we may fill the blank with action verbs like groom, kiss, walk, salute and 
ride, etc., but not psyche verbs like hate, like and respect. In the answers to the second question, the blank can 
be filled only with the above psyche verbs but not those action verbs. 
8When Continuity holds between <l> and ljl, we may say that <l> is Continued by 'I' or 'I' is Continuation of <I>. 
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which al so  separates it from R(�). thus making the dynamic binding impossible. Now let us 
apply (33) to some concrete examples. 
(34) a Each candidate1 for the space mission meets all our requirements. He1 has a Ph.D. in 
astrophysics and extensive prior flight experience. 
b. Every participant1 has to take an HIV test. He1 also needs to take a drug test. 
c. Each candidate1 walked up to the stage. He1 took his diploma from the Dean and 
returned to his1 seat. 
34a, b and c are cases of cll<:>\11, <1>&111, and <1»111 respectively. Since they all meet the 
Continuity condition, 1!11Ch or every in all these examples are translated in the form of 3 3 a In 
contrast, every!I!IICh in 35 should be translated according to 33b because none of these 
examples satisfies the Continuity condition. 
(35) a Every candidate1 for the space mission meets our requirement. *He1 has already been 
interviewed by the Project Director. 
b. Every participant1 has to take an HIV test. *He1 is worried about it. . 
c. Every candidate1 walked up to the stage. * He1 did not like the Dean sitting there. 
Take Every participant has to take an HW test for example. As the first sentence in 34b, it is 
translated as 36a and as the first sentence in 35b, it is translated as 36b. 
(36) a. �d.;! d2[[tparticipant(d1); tHIV test (dz)] .... ttake (d2, dl)] 
b. -;!d1;!d2[tparticipant(d.); tHiv test (dz); -ttake (dz, d1 )] 
It is quite evident that while the universal quantifier in 36a can bind a variable in the 
subsequent sentence, the existential quantifier in 36b can not. 
Along the same line of analysis, implication may be translated either as 37a or 37b, 
depending on whether Continuity condition can be satisfied. 
(37) Contextualized Translation of If <I>, then II'· Y 
a. <1>�[111;Y ] if Cont <111,Y>; or 
b. -[<1>;-111];Y 
(37) offers a semantic characterization of the grammatical contrast between 38a on one hand 
and 38b and 38c on the other. 
(38) a If a farmer• owns a donkeyz, he1 beats itz all the time. *He1 hates itz. 
b. If a farmer1 owns a donkeyz, he1 hates itz. He. beats itz all the time. 
c. If a farmer1 owns a donkeyz, he1 uses itz to carry heavy burdens. He1 rides itz to the 
market. 
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Of these three examples 38b is a case of elle:>IV and 38c is an instance of ell& IV. But 38a does 
not satisfY the Continuity condition. Consequently, if .. (then) in 38b and 38c should be 
translated according to 37a whereas the same expression in 38a is to be translated in the form 
of37b. 39a and 39b are translations of 38a and 38b respectively. 
(39) a. -!:2dQdz[[tfarmer(d1); tdonkey(dz); town (dz, d,)]; - tbeat (dz,d,)]; Thate(dz,d,) 
b. [ 2 d1.2dz [tfarmer(d1); tdonkey (dz); t own(dz,d,)]]=> [Thate[dz,d,); tbeat (dz,d,)]] 
In (39a), the whole implication is within the scope of negation, hence neither ;ld, nor 2dz can 
bind any variable in the subsequent sentence. As for (39b ), application of (7) turns it into ( 40). 
Although the main negation in 40 takes scope over everything else in the formula, 
it does not cut off the existential quantifiers from the second conjunct, hence both 
existential quantifiers can bind variables in the subsequent sentence. 
Like universal quantification and implication, disjunction may also be interpreted in two 
ways, one with internal and the other with external negation. 
( 41) Contextualized Translation of ell or IV; Y 
a. -[ -[ell;Y];-[IV;YJ] ifCont<ell,Y> and Cont<IV,Y>;or 
b. -[4;-IV];Y 
The Continuity condition in 41 requires that Continuity hold between each of the disjuncts 
(i.e., ell and IV) and the subsequent sentence Y, which also presupposes that a variable in Y has a 
potential antecedent in both ell and IV· Compare 42a with 42b, for instance. 
( 42) a. Either John is making coffee1 or Mary went out to get a cokez. It112 is sugar free. 
b. Either John is home or Mary went out to get a coke,. *It, is sugar free. 
(43) a. [John is making tea. It is sugar free] or Mary went out to get a coke. It is 
sugar free] 
b. [Jolm is home. *It is sugar free] or [Mary went out to get a coke. It is sugar 
free] 
To test whether 42a and 42b satisfY the Continuity condition, we first regroup them as in 43. 
In 43a, both disjuncts are cases of elle:>IV. Besides, the pronominal it has a potential antecedent 
in both ell (i.e., John is making coffee) and IV (i.e., Mary went out to get a coke). In 43b, 
however, Y (i.e., It is sugar free) is not a Continuation of ell (i.e., John is at home). Besides, 
the pronominal it in Y does not have a potential antecedent in ell. Accordingly, we apply 4 la  to 
42a and 41b to 42b and the results are as foUows: 
(44) a. -H.2a'Qdz [tJohn (d,) tcoffee (dz); tmake (dz, d,); t sugar-free (dz)]]; 
-[.2a'J2t:4 [tMary (dJ); tcoke(£4); twent-out-get (t4 d3); tsugar-free (1:4)]]] 
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b. -[-[;jd1 [tJohn (d1); thorne (d.)]]; -2 dijd3 [Mary (d2);t coke (d3); 
twent-out-to-get (d3, d2))]; tsugar-free(d3) 
4 5 3  
However, although 41 makes correct prediction about intersentential binding between 
a disjunction and its continuation, it does not say anything about internally dynamic disjunctions 
in the following examples. 
(45) a. Either a maid1 is making coff� or sheds preparing teal.· It213 is sugar free. 
b. A student1 can take an exam2 or he; can make a presentation3. Either way, he; has to 
prepare carefully. 
Given that <I> or lji;Y = -[-[<l>;Y]; -[lji;Y)], the internal dynamics seems unexpected because <I> 
is apparently within the scope of a negation which separates it from ljl. I argue, however, that 
this problem arises from some confusion over the internal structure of the disjunction. It is 
noted by G&S that these internally dynamic disjunctions are reanalyzable as implications. The 
disjunctions in 45a and 45b may be paraphrased as 46a and 46b. 
( 46) a. If a maid1 is not making coff�, then she1 is preparing tea3. 
b. If a student1 does not take an exam2, then he1 will have to make a presentation3, 
To preserve the meaning of 45a and 45b, negation is introduced in the implications in 
46. But interestingly, the negation introduced is not allowed to take wide scope in the 
implications, as shown in 47. 
(47) a. * If  no maid1 is making coff�, then she; is making tea3. 
b. * If no student• takes an exam2, he; will have to make a presentation3. 
This suggests that 46a and 46b should be interpreted as 48a and 48b, with the quantifier taking 
scope over the negation. 
( 48) a. For x, x is a maid, if x is not making coffee, then x is preparing tea. 
b. For all x, x is a student, ifx does not take a exam, it has to make a presentation. 
For the same reason, 45a and 45b should be interpreted as 49a and 49b. 
(49) a. For x, x is a maid, it is not true that x is not making coffee AND x is not preparing 
tea.] 
b. For all x, x is a student, it is not true that x does not have to take an exam AND x 
does not have to make a presentation. 
On the basis of the above evidence, I propose the following translation for the internal structure 
of disjunction. 
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(50) Translation for the Internally Dynamic Disjunction 
a. ad; [P(�);Q(�)] or [R(�)]= ad;[P(�);(Q(�) orR(�)]]= ad;[P(�); -[(--Q(�)]; 
-[R(�)]] if ad; [P(�); Q(�)] or [R(�)]= ad; [P(�); --Q(�)=>R(�)] 
b. ad; [P(�); Q (�)] or [R(�)]; [S(�)] = ad;[P(�); [Q(�); S(�)] or [R(�); S(�))] = 
ad;[P(�); H-[Q(�); S(�)]; -[R(�); S(�)]]] ifboth 55a and 46a apply. 
According to 50, 45a and 45b are translated as 5 1  a and 51b respectively. 
(5 1)  a. 2dt[[[tmaid (dt)]; -[-2d2[tcoffee(d2);fmake(d2,dt);tsugar-free(d2)]; 
-� d3[ttea(d3); t prepare(d3,d1); tsugar-free(d3))]] 
b. Jl:dt[[[tstudent (d1)];-[.....f. � [texam(�); ttake(�,dt); t prepare carefully (dt)]; 
-(2d3 [tpaper(dl); t write (d3, dt); tprepare carefuUy(dt)]]] 
As 2d1 in 51 a or J[d1 in 5 1  b takes scope over all the negations, either can dynamically bind any 
appropriate variable in the entire formula. 
4. Conclusion 
As DMG is essentially concerned with the distribution and reference of intersentential 
anaphors, it should be no surprise that a discourse component should become an indispensible 
part of the theory. A case in point is the treatment of negation, the main topic of the present 
discussion.. It is weD !mown that the distribution of intersentential anaphors is inextricably 
involved with scope of negation. But we are unable to determine the scope of a particular 
negation without considering the effect of discourse relation. So it is clear that an adequate 
theory of intersentential anaophora has to study how discourse relation affects scope ot 
negation. What is not quite clear is how a discourse compoenent should fit into the system and 
communicate with other components of grammar. A lot of interesting research has been done 
on this topic by linguists working within the tradition ofDRT (eg. Asher 1994). But among 
those who advocate a compositional approach to intersentential apahora, this is a much 
neglected topic. The contextualized translation proposed herein offers a possible way to 
introduce discourse component into a compositional theory of anaphora based on the core 
DMG. 
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